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Location Verification Systems Under Spatially
Correlated Shadowing
Shihao Yan, Ido Nevat, Gareth W. Peters, and Robert Malaney
Abstract—The verification of the location information utilized
in wireless communication networks is a subject of growing
importance. In this work we formally analyze, for the first time,
the performance of a wireless Location Verification System (LVS)
under the realistic setting of spatially correlated shadowing.
Our analysis illustrates that anticipated levels of correlated
shadowing can lead to a dramatic performance improvement of a
Received Signal Strength (RSS)-based LVS. We also analyze the
performance of an LVS that utilizes Differential Received Signal
Strength (DRSS), formally proving the rather counter-intuitive
result that a DRSS-based LVS has identical performance to that
of an RSS-based LVS, for all levels of correlated shadowing. Even
more surprisingly, the identical performance of RSS and DRSS-
based LVSs is found to hold even when the adversary does not
optimize his true location. Only in the case where the adversary
does not optimize all variables under her control, do we find the
performance of an RSS-based LVS to be better than a DRSS-
based LVS. The results reported here are important for a wide
range of emerging wireless communication applications whose
proper functioning depends on the authenticity of the location
information reported by a transceiver.
Index Terms—Location verification, wireless networks, Re-
ceived Signal Strength (RSS), Differential Received Signal
Strength (DRSS), spatially correlated shadowing.
I. INTRODUCTION
As location information becomes of growing importance in
wireless networks, procedures to formally authenticate (verify)
that information have attracted considerable research interest
[1–10]. In a wide range of emerging wireless networks, the
system may request a device (user) to report its location
obtained through some independent means (e.g., via a Global
Positioning System (GPS) receiver embedded in the device).
Such location information can be used to empower some
functionalities or services of wireless networks, such as geo-
graphic routing protocols (e.g., [11–13]), location-based access
control protocols (e.g., [14, 15]), and location-based services
(e.g., location-based key generation [16]). However, the use of
location information as an enabler of functionality or services
within the wireless network, also provides ample opportunity
to attack the system since any reported location information
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can be easily spoofed. Such potential attacks are perhaps most
concerning in the context of emerging Intelligent Transport
Systems (ITS) such as vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs),
where spoofed positions may lead to catastrophic results for
vehicular collision-avoidance systems [18].
In this work, we focus on a formal analysis of LVSs
that attempt to verify a user’s claimed location (such as a
GPS location) based on independent observations received by
the wireless communications network itself. The inference in
such an LVS is carried out to determine whether the claimed
location represents a legitimate user (a user who reports/claims
to the network a location consistent with his true position) or
a malicious user (a user who reports to the network a location
inconsistent with his true position). A key difference between
an LVS and a localization system is that the output of an LVS
is a binary decision (legitimate/malicious user), whereas in
localization system the output is an estimated location (e.g.,
[19–21]). As such, an LVS is provided with some additional
a priori (but potentially false) location information (i.e., a
claimed location).
Since the RSS measured by wireless network is easily
obtained, many location verification algorithms that utilize
RSS as input observations have been developed (e.g., [3, 5, 6,
9, 10]). In addition, RSS can be readily combined with other
location information metrics in order to improve the perfor-
mance of a localization system [22, 23]. However, shadowing
is one of the most influential factors in RSS-based LVSs, and
all existing studies in RSS-based LVSs have made a simplified
but unrealistic assumption that the shadowing at two different
locations is uncorrelated. As per many empirical studies, the
shadowing at different locations will be significantly correlated
when the locations are close to each other or different locations
possess similar terrain configurations (e.g., [24–26]). Although
some specific studies have investigated the performance of
RSS-based localization systems under correlated shadowing
[27–29], the impact of spatially correlated shadowing on
RSS-based LVSs under realistic threat models has not been
previously explored. This leaves an important gap in our
understanding on the performance levels of RSS-based LVSs
in realistic wireless channel settings and under realistic threat
models. The main purpose of this paper is to close this gap.
Further to our considerations of RSS-based LVSs, we note
that there could be circumstances where the use of Differential
Received Signal Strength (DRSS) in the LVS context may
be beneficial. Indeed it is well known that there are a range
of scenarios in which the use of DRSS is more suitable
for wireless location acquisition [30]. One example is where
users do not have a common transmit power. However, the
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performance of DRSS-based LVSs have not yet been analyzed
in the literature. This work also closes this gap, extending
our analysis of DRSS-based LVSs to the correlated shadowing
regime. This will allow us to provide a detailed performance
comparison between RSS-based LVSs and DRSS-based LVSs
under correlated shadowing - a comparison that provides for
a few surprising results.
A summary of the main contributions of this work are as
follows. (i) Under spatially correlated log-normal shadowing,
we analyze the detection performance of an RSS-based LVS
in terms of false positive and detection rates. Our analysis
demonstrates that the spatial correlation of the shadowing can
lead to a significant performance improvement for the RSS-
based LVS relative to the case with uncorrelated shadowing
(a doubling of the detection rate for a given false positive
rate for anticipated correlation levels). (ii) We analyze the
detection performance of a DRSS-based LVS under spatially
correlated shadowing, proving that the detection performance
of the DRSS-based LVS is identical to that of the RSS-based
LVS. As we discuss later, this result is rather surprising. (iii)
We analyze our systems under a relaxed threat model scenario
in which the adversary whose actual location is physically
constrained (e.g., constrained within a building) and therefore
cannot optimize his location for the attack. We show that
even in these circumstances the performances of the RSS-
based LVS and the DRSS-based LVS remain identical. (iv)
Finally, we illustrate the case where the RSS-based LVS do
have advantages over the DRSS-Based LVS, namely, when the
adversary does not (or cannot) optimize his boosted transmit
power level.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II details our system model. In Section III, the detection
performance of the RSS-based LVS is analyzed under spatially
correlated shadowing. In Section IV, the detection perfor-
mance of the DRSS-based LVS is analyzed, and a throughout
performance comparison between the RSS-based LVS and the
DRSS-based LVS is provided. Section V provides numerical
results to verify the accuracy of our analysis. Finally, Section
VII draws concluding remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Assumptions
We outline the system model and state the assumptions
adopted in this work.
1) A single user (legitimate or malicious) reports his
claimed location, xc = [x1c ; x
2
c ] 2 R2, to a network with
N Base Stations (BSs) in the communication range of
the user, where the publicly known location of the i-
th BS is xi = [x1i ; x
2
i ] 2 R2 (i = 1; 2; : : : ; N ). Any
one of the N BSs can be chosen as the Process Center
(PC), and all other BSs will transmit the measurements
collected from the user to the PC.
2) The user (legitimate or malicious) can obtain his true
position, xt = [x1t ; x
2
t ], from his localization equipment
(e.g., GPS), and the localization error is zero. Thus,
a legitimate user’s claimed location, xc, is exactly the
same as his true location. However, a malicious user will
falsify (spoof) his claimed position in an attempt to fool
the LVS. We assume the spoofed claimed location of the
malicious user is also xc.
3) We adopt the minimum distance model as our threat
model, in which the distance between the malicious
user’s true location and his claimed location is greater or
equal to r, i.e., kxc xtk  r. In this work, we assume
the value of r is known to the PC as a priori information.
In practice, there are three main methods to assign the
value of r. The first method is an assignment based on
the network operator’s view of how close an attacker
can be to his claimed location whilst having no fear
of physical apprehension (see later discussion in Sec-
tion VI). A second method could be one dictated by the
physical environment. For example, it could be that the
threat model is based on a stationary attacker positioned
off the highway, and the physical environment (e.g., a
fence) dictates he must be a minimum distance from the
highway [31–33]. A third method is to set the value of
r based on the expected localization error (e.g., GPS
error) of a legitimate user. In this case, r would be set
so as to guarantee a low probability that the legitimate
user’s true location is outside the region determined by
xc and r. A combination (e.g., weighted value) of all
methods could also be used.
4) We denote the null hypothesis where the user is legiti-
mate as H0, and denote the alternative hypothesis where
the user is malicious as H1. The a priori knowledge at
the LVS can be summarized as(
H0 : xc = xt (legitimate user),
H1 : kxc   xtk  r (malicious user):
(1)
B. Observation Model under H0
Based on the log-normal propagation model, the RSS (in
dB) received by the i-th BS from a legitimate user, yi, is
given by
yi = ui + !i; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N; (2)
where
ui = p  10 log10

dci
d

; (3)
and p is a reference received power corresponding to a
reference distance d,  is the path loss exponent, !i is a
zero-mean normal random variable with variance 2dB , and
dci is the Euclidean distance from the i-th BS to the legitimate
user’s claimed location (also his true location) given by
dci = kxc   xik. We note that dci = dti under H0, where
dti = kxt xik. In practice, in order to determine the values of
p and d we have to know the transmit power of the legitimate
user. We highlight that in this work we assume that the transmit
power of the legitimate user is known to the LVS. This is
mainly due to the fact that the legitimate user cooperates
with the LVS in order to facilitate the location verification.
To this end, the legitimate user will set his transmit power
to a predetermined value set by the LVS. For fairness, we
also assume that the malicious user also knows the transmit
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power of the legitimate user (equivalently, knows the values
of p and d), which allows the malicious user to optimally
set his transmit power in order to minimize the probability
to be detected. Under spatially correlated shadowing, !i is
correlated to !j (j = 1; 2; : : : ; N ), and the N N covariance
matrix of ! = [!1; : : : ; !N ] is denoted as R. Adopting the
well-known spatially correlated shadowing model of [7, 24],
the (i; j)-th element of R is given by
Rij = 
2
dB exp

 dij
Dc
ln 2

; j = 1; 2; : : : ; N; (4)
where dij = kxi xjk is the Euclidean distance from the i-th
BS to the j-th BS and Dc is a constant in units of distance,
at which the correlation coefficient reduces to 1=2 (in this
work all distances are in meters). From (4), we can see that
the correlation between !i and !j decreases as dij increases
(Rij = 2dB when i = j, and Rij ! 0 as dij !1). We also
note that Rij increases as Dc increases for a given dij . As
such, Dc is a parameter that indicates the degree of shadowing
correlation in some specific environment (for a given dij , a
larger Dc means that the shadowing is more correlated).
Based on (2), we can see that under H0 the N -dimensional
observation vector y = [y1; : : : ; yN ]T follows a multivariate
normal distribution, which is
f (yjH0) = N (u;R) ; (5)
where u = [u1; u2; : : : ; uN ]T is the mean vector.
C. Observation Model under H1
In practice, in addition to spoofing the claimed location, the
malicious user can also adjust his transmit power to impact
the RSS values received by all BSs in order to minimize the
probability of being detected. As such, the RSS received by
the i-th BS from a malicious user, yi, is given by
yi = px + vi + !i; (6)
where
vi = p  10 log10

dti
d

; (7)
and px is the additional boosted transmit power. We note that
px is the same for all the BSs since the additional transmit
power only effects the value of p and the distance between
i-th BS and the malicious user is absorbed by vi. Based
on (6), under H1 the N -dimensional observation vector y,
conditioned on known px and xt, also follows a multivariate
normal distribution, which is
f (yjpx;xt;H1) = N (px1N + v;R) ; (8)
where 1N is a N 1 vector with all elements set to unity and
v = [v1; v2; : : : ; vN ]
T . We note that in practice px and xt are
set by the malicious user.
D. Decision Rule of an LVS
We adopt the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) as the decision
rule since it is optimal for binary hypothesis testing problem
in terms of achieving the highest detection rate for any
given false positive rate [34]. Therefore, the LRT can achieve
the minimum Bayesain average cost [35] and the maximum
mutual information between the input and output of an LVS
[10]. Given that no related work on LVSs under correlated
shadowing is available in the literature, in this work we
focus on analyzing the detection performances of our LVSs
rather than comparisons with other works. We note that the
deployment of the LRT requires that the likelihood functions
under both H0 and H1 can be evaluated exactly in analytic
forms (i.e., there are no nuisance parameters involved in these
likelihood functions). In general, the likelihood function under
H1 is dependent on some parameters (e.g., px, xt) that are
unknown to the LVS. In this work we adopt a conservative
scenario, in which we assume that the malicious user can
optimize all the parameters under his control. We refer to
this scenario as the worst-case scenario throughout this work.
In practice, if the malicious user cannot optimize all the
parameters under his control, our analysis based on the worst-
case scenario serves as the lower bound for the detection
performance of a practical LVS. The LRT decision rule is
given by
 ( (y)) , f ( (y)jH1)
f ( (y)jH0)
D1
<
D0
; (9)
where  ( (y)) is the test statistic,  (y) is a predefined
transformation of y, f ( (y)jH1) is the likelihood function
(probability density function of  (y)) under H1, f ( (y)jH0)
is the likelihood function under H0,  is the threshold corre-
sponding to  ( (y)), D0 and D1 are the binary decisions that
infer whether the user is legitimate or malicious, respectively.
It is worth noting that another definition of the likelihood ratio
(e.g., composite likelihood ratio) has to be adopted if some
parameters under H0 and H1 are unknown. In our work, (9)
does not involve any unknown parameters based on the worst-
case scenario. We clarify that in our RSS-based LVS we have
 (y) = y, i.e., no transformation function is utilized in the
RSS-based LVS. In our DRSS-based LVS the transformation
function  () maps the RSS into DRSS (detailed in Section
IV-A). Although  (y) in our work is still normal given that
y is normal,  (y) is not necessarily normal since the trans-
formation may be not linear. Given the decision rule in (9),
the false positive and detection rates of an LVS are functions
of . The intrinsic core performance metrics of an LVS are
false positive and detection rates, other potential performance
metrics can be written as functions of these two rates. As such,
in this work we adopt the false positive and detection rates as
the performance metrics for an LVS. We note that a priori
probabilities may be required for some performance metrics
adopted by an LVS. For example, the Bayesian average cost
is defined as C = P0C0 + (1  P0)(1  )C1, where P0 is
the a priori probability that H0 is true, C0 is the pre-assigned
cost of rejecting a legitimate user, and C1 is the pre-assigned
cost of accepting a malicious user [35]. We highlight that in
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 4
order to achieve the overall minimum Bayesian average cost
the likelihood ratio (i.e.,  ( (y))) should be adopted as the
test statistic.
III. RSS-BASED LOCATION VERIFICATION SYSTEM
In this section, we analyze the performance of the RSS-
based LVS in terms of the false positive and detection rates,
based on which we examine the impact of the spatially
correlated shadowing.
A. Attack Strategy of the Malicious User
We assume that the malicious user optimizes all the param-
eters under his control. This assumption is adopted in most
threat models. The ultimate goal of the malicious user is to
minimize the detection rate. To this end, the malicious user
is to minimize the KL divergence from f (yjpx;xt;H1) to
f (yjH0) [36]. This result is mainly due to the fact that the
threshold  and observation y are unknown to the malicious
user and the KL divergence from f (yjpx;xt;H1) to f (yjH0)
is the expected log likelihood ratio when the alternative
hypothesis H1 is true.
Based on (5) and (8), the KL divergence from
f (yjpx;xt;H1) to f (yjH0) is given by [37]
(px;xt) = DKL [f (yjpx;xt;H1) jjf (yjH0)]
=
Z 1
 1
ln
f (yjpx;xt;H1)
f (yjH0) f (yjpx;xt;H1) dy
=
1
2
(px1N + v   u)TR 1(px1N + v   u): (10)
Then, the optimal values of px and xt that minimize (px;xt)
can be obtained through
(px;x

t ) = argmin
px;kxt xckr
(px;xt): (11)
The closed-form expressions for px and x

t are intractable,
but they can be obtained through numerical search. In order
to simplify the numerical search, we first derive the optimal
value of px for a given xt, which is presented in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1: The optimal value of px that minimizes (px;xt)
for any given xt is
pox(xt) =
(u  v)TR 11N
1TNR
 11N
: (12)
Proof: The first derivative of (px;xt) with respect to px
is derived as
@(px;xt)
@px
=
@(px;xt)
@ (px1N )
@ (px1N )
@px
= (px1N + v   u)TR 1 @ (px1N )
@px
= (px1N + v   u)TR 11N : (13)
Following (13), the second derivative of (px;xt) with respect
to px is derived as
@2(px;xt)
@2px
= 1TNR
 11N : (14)
Noting that R given by (4) is a positive-definite matrix, as
per (14) we have @2(px;xt)=@2px > 0, which indicates
that (px;xt) is a convex function of px. As such, setting
@(px;xt)=@px = 0, we obtain the desired result in (12) after
some algebraic manipulations.
From Lemma 1, we note that the malicious user optimizes
his transmit power, i.e., px = pox(xt), to compensate the
path-loss difference between his claimed location and his
true location. We also note that pox(xt) is a function of R
under spatial correlated shadowing. This is different from
the scenario with uncorrelated shadowing, where pox(xt) is
independent of the shadowing noise [10]. Substituting pox(xt)
into (10), we have
(pox(xt);xt) =
1
2
(w   u)TR 1(w   u); (15)
where
w =
(u  v)TR 11N
1TNR
 11N
1N + v: (16)
Since we have shown that (px;xt) is a convex function of
px in (14), xt can be obtained through
xt = argmin
kxt xckr
(pox(xt);xt): (17)
Substituting xt into p
o
x(xt), we obtain p

x = p
o
x(x

t ). We
note that Lemma 1 is of importance since it reduces a three-
dimension numerical search in (11) into a two-dimension
numerical search in (17). On average, the computing time
required to search for xt in (17) is around 20 seconds when
the grid search method is adopted and 100 points in each
dimension are searched (based on MATLAB R2014b on a
DELL desktop with a Core i7 processor).
Substituting px and x

t into (6), the RSS received by the
i-th BS from a malicious user can be written as
y = w + !; (18)
where
w =
(u  v)TR 11N
1TNR
 11N
1N + v; (19)
v is obtained by substituting xt into v. Based on (18), the
likelihood function under H1 conditioned on px and xt can
be written as
f (yjpx;xt ;H1) = N (w;R): (20)
B. Performance of the RSS-based LVS
In some practical cases, the malicious user may not have
the freedom to optimize his true location, e.g., the malicious
user is physically limited to be inside a building. However,
the malicious user can still optimize his transmit power as
per his true location. As such, without losing generality, we
first analyze the performance of the RSS-based LVS for px =
pox(xt), and then present the performance of the RSS-based
LVS for px = px and xt = x

t as a special case.
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Following (9) and noting  (y) = y, the specific LRT
decision rule of the RSS-based LVS for px = pox(xt) is given
by
o (y) , f (yjp
o
x(xt);xt;H1)
f (yjH0)
D1
<
D0
oR; (21)
where o (y) is the likelihood ratio of y for px = pox(xt),
f (yjpox(xt);xt;H1) = N (w;R), and oR is a threshold for
o (y). Then, we obtain o (y) in the ln domain as
lno (y)=
1
2
(y u)TR 1(y u) 1
2
(y w)TR 1(y w)
= (w u)T R 1y 1
2
(w u)T R 1 (w+u) :
As such, for the theorem to follow, we can rewrite the decision
rule in (21) as the following format
T(y)
D1
<
D0
 R; (22)
where T(y) is the test statistic given by
T(y) , (w   u)T R 1y; (23)
and  R is the threshold for T(y) given by
 R , lnoR +
1
2
(w   u)T R 1 (w + u) : (24)
We note that (22) is the explicit binary decision rule at
the PC for the RSS-based LVS. In (22) only the test statistic
T(y) is a function of the observations. The threshold  R can
be determined by setting an acceptable false positive rate,
minimizing the Bayesian average cost, or maximizing the
mutual information between the input and output of the RSS-
based LVS. To this end, we have to derive the false positive
rate, oR, and detection rate, 
o
R, of the RSS-based LVS, which
are provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For px = pox(xt), the false positive and
detection rates of the RSS-based LVS are
oR(xt) = Q
24  R   (w u)T R 1uq
(w u)T R 1 (w u)
35
= Q
24 lnoR + 12 (w u)T R 1 (w u)q
(w u)T R 1 (w u)
35 ; (25)
oR(xt) = Q
24  R   (w u)T R 1wq
(w u)T R 1 (w u)
35
= Q
24 lnoR   12 (w u)T R 1 (w u)q
(w u)T R 1 (w u)
35 ; (26)
where Q[x] = 1p
2
R1
x
exp( t2=2)dt.
Proof: Using (23), the distributions of T(y) under H0
and H1 are derived as follows
T(y)jH0  N

(w u)T R 1u; (w u)T R 1 (w u)

; (27)
T(y)jH1  N

(w u)T R 1w; (w u)T R 1 (w u)

:
(28)
As per the decision rule in (22), the false positive and detection
rates are given by
oR(xt) , Pr (T(y)   RjH0) ; (29)
oR(xt) , Pr (T(y)   RjH1) : (30)
Substituting (27) and (28) into (29) and (30), respectively,
we obtain the results in (25) and (26) after some algebraic
manipulations.
For px = px and xt = x

t , the LRT decision rule of the
RSS-based LVS is given by
 (y) , f (yjp

x;x

t ;H1)
f (yjH0)
D1
<
D0
R; (31)
where  (y) is the likelihood ratio of y for px = px and xt =
xt , and 

R is a threshold for 
 (y). Following Theorem 1,
the false positive and detection rates of the RSS-based LVS
for px = px and xt = x

t are given by
R = Q
24 lnR + 12 (w u)T R 1 (w u)q
(w u)T R 1 (w u)
35 ; (32)
R = Q
24 lnR   12 (w u)T R 1 (w u)q
(w u)T R 1 (w u)
35 : (33)
We note that the results provided in (25) and (26) are based
on an arbitrary true location xt of the malicious user, which
are more general than that provided in (32) and (33). That is,
R = 
o
R(x

t ) and 

R = 
o
R(x

t ). By using (25) and (26),
we can compare the performance of the RSS-based LVS with
that of the DRSS-based LVS in a general scenario. We also
note that based on (32) and (33) we can examine the impact
of shadowing correlation on the detection performance of the
RSS-based LVS. Considering the properties of the Q-function,
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The detection performance of the RSS-based
LVS increases as  , (w u)T R 1 (w u) increases, i.e.,
R increases for any fixed 

R as  increases (or 

R decreases
for any fixed R as  increases).
Proof: Let us suppose we have two LVSs, LVS-1 and
LVS-2. We assume that the false positive rate and detection
rate of LVS-k (k 2 f1; 2g) are given by, respectively,
k = Q

lnk +
1
2kp
k

= Q

lnkp
k
+
p
k
2

; (34)
k = Q

lnk   12kp
k

= Q

lnkp
k
 
p
k
2

: (35)
We note that Q[x] is a monotonic decreasing function of x.
Then, following (34) and setting 1 = 2, we have
ln1p
1
+
p
1
2
=
ln2p
2
+
p
2
2
: (36)
Suppose 1 < 2, by subtracting
p
1 and
p
2 from the left
side and right side of (36), respectively, we have
ln1p
1
 
p
1
2
>
ln2p
2
 
p
2
2
: (37)
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As such, following (35) and (37) we have 1 < 2. Therefore,
we have proved that 1 < 2 for 1 = 2 if 1 < 2.
Similarly, we can prove that 1 > 2 for 1 = 2 if 1 < 2.
Comparing (32) and (33) with (34) and (35), respectively, the
proof follows.
Corollary 1 is consistent with our previous conclusion that
the malicious user will minimize the KL-divergence given in
(10) in order to minimize the detection performance of an LVS,
because 12 (w
 u)T R 1 (w u) is the minimum value of the
KL-divergence given in (15). Therefore, in order to examine
the impact of the shadowing correlation we only have to check
whether an increased correlation (e.g., increased Dc) leads to
an increased or decreased value of 12 (w
 u)T R 1 (w u).
Due to the fact that xt cannot be obtained analytically, it is
impossible to theoretically analyze the impact of shadowing
correlation on the detection performance of the RSS-based
LVS. In this regard, we will examine this impact numeri-
cally. As we will show in Section V the correlation of the
shadowing leads to performance improvements in practical
scenarios. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the shadowing
correlation reduces the uncertainty of the observations caused
by shadowing noise, and consequently it becomes harder for
the malicious user to mimic these observations. Following
Corollary 1, we have the following corollary with regard to
how the values of 2dB effect the performance of the RSS-
based LVS.
Corollary 2: The detection rate of the RSS-based LVS de-
creases as 2dB increases for any arbitrary fixed false positive
rate (or the false positive rate of the RSS-based LVS increases
as 2dB increases for any arbitrary fixed detection rate).
Following Corollary 1, we can prove Corollary 2 by noting
that  decreases as 2dB increases due to (4).
IV. DRSS-BASED LOCATION VERIFICATION SYSTEM
In this section, we analyze the detection performance of the
DRSS-based LVS under spatially correlated shadowing. We
also provide an analytical comparison between the RSS-based
LVS and the DRSS-based LVS.
A. DRSS Observations
We obtain (N   1) basic DRSS observations from N RSS
observations by subtracting the N -th RSS observation from
all other (N   1) RSS observations. As such, the m-th DRSS
value under H0 is given by
ym = um +!m; m = 1; 2; : : : ; N   1; (38)
where um = um uN and !m = !m !N . We note that
!m is Gaussian with zero mean and variance 2(2dB RmN ).
We denote the (N   1)  (N   1) covariance matrix of the
(N 1)-dimensional DRSS vectory = [y1; : : : ;yN 1]T
as D, whose (m;n)-th element is given by (n = 1; 2; : : : ; N 
1)
Dmn = RNN +Rmn  RmN  RnN : (39)
As such, y under H0 follows a multivariate normal distri-
bution, which is given by
f (yjH0) = N (u;D); (40)
where u = [u1; : : : ;uN 1]T is the mean vector.
Likewise, the m-th DRSS value under H1 is
ym = vm +!m; (41)
where vm = vm   vN . Noting v = [v1; : : : ;vN 1]T ,
y underH1 follows another multivariate normal distribution,
which is given by
f (yjxt;H1) = N (v;D): (42)
B. Attack Strategy of the Malicious User
As per (3) and (7), we know that both p and d are constant
at all elements of u and v. As such, based on (38) and (41)
we can see that y under both H0 and H1 is independent of
p and d, and therefore both f (yjH0) and f (yjxt;H1)
are independent of p and d. As such, in the DRSS-based LVS
the malicious user does not need to adjust his transmit power
in order to minimize the detection rate. In the DRSS-based
LVS, the malicious user only has to optimize his true location
through minimizing the KL-divergence from f (yjxt;H1)
to f (yjH0), which is given by
'(xt) = DKL [f (yjxt;H1) jjf (yjH0)]
=
Z 1
 1
ln
f (yjxt;H1)
f (yjH0) f (yjxt;H1) dy
=
1
2
(v  u)TD 1(v  u): (43)
Then, the optimal value of xt for the malicious user in the
DRSS-based LVS can be obtained through
xyt = argmin
kxt xckr
'(xt): (44)
The likelihood function under H1 for xt = xyt is given by
f

yjxyt ;H1

= N (vy;D); (45)
where vym = v
y
m  vyN and vy is obtained by substituting xyt
into v.
C. Performance of the DRSS-based LVS
In this subsection, we again consider the case where the
true location of the malicious user is physically constrained.
Specifically, we first analyze the performance of the DRSS-
based LVS for an arbitrary xt, and then present the perfor-
mance of the DRSS-based LVS for xt = x
y
t as a special case
in this subsection.
Following (9), the specific LRT decision rule of the DRSS-
based LVS for any xt is given by
 (y) , f (yjxt;H1)
f (yjH0)
D1
<
D0
D; (46)
where  (y) is the likelihood ratio of y and D is a
threshold for  (y). Substituting (40) and (45) into (46),
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we obtain  (y) in ln domain as
ln  (y) =
1
2
(y  u)TD 1(y  u)
  1
2
(y  v)TD 1(y  v)
= (v  u)TD 1y
  1
2
(v  u)TD 1(v +u):
Then, we can rewrite the decision rule given in (46) as
T(y)
D0
<
D1
 D; (47)
where T(y) is the test statistic given by
T(y) , (v  u)TD 1y; (48)
and  D is the threshold for T(y) given by
 D , lnD +
1
2
(v  u)TD 1(v +u): (49)
We would like to highlight that (47) is the explicit binary
decision rule at the PC for the DRSS-based LVS. In (47) only
the test statistic T(y) depends on the DRSS observations
y. The threshold  D can be determined by setting an
acceptable false positive rate, minimizing the Bayesian average
cost, or maximizing the mutual information between the input
and output of the DRSS-based LVS. In this regard, the false
positive rate, D(xt), and the detection rate, D(xt), of the
DRSS-based LVS have to be derived, which are present in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2: The false positive and detection rates of the
DRSS-based LVS for any xt are given by
D(xt) = Q
24  D   (v u)T D 1uq
(v u)T D 1 (v u)
35
= Q
24 lnD + 12 (v u)T D 1 (v u)q
(v u)T D 1 (v u)
35 ;
(50)
D(xt) = Q
24  D   (v u)T D 1vq
(v u)T D 1 (v u)
35
= Q
24 lnD   12 (v u)T D 1 (v u)q
(v u)T D 1 (v u)
35 :
(51)
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to that of Theorem 1 and
omitted here due to page limits.
For xt = x
y
t , the LRT decision rule of the DRSS-based LVS
is given by
 (y) , f (yjxt;H1)
f (yjH0)
D1
<
D0
D; (52)
where  (y) is the likelihood ratio of y for xt = x
y
t
and D is a threshold for 
 (y). Following Theorem 2,
the false positive and detection rates of the DRSS-based LVS
for xt = x
y
t are given by
D = Q
2664 lnD + 12

vy u
T
D 1

vy u

r
vy u
T
D 1

vy u

3775 ;
(53)
D = Q
2664 lnD   12

vy u
T
D 1

vy u

r
vy u
T
D 1

vy u

3775 :
(54)
Again, note that the results provided in (50) and (51) are for
any xt, which are more general than that provided in (53) and
(54). That is, D = D(x
y
t) and 

D = D(x
y
t). By using (50)
and (51), we can compare the performance of the DRSS-based
LVS with that of the RSS-based LVS in a general scenario.
D. Comparison between the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-
based LVS
We now present the following theorem with regard to the
comparison between the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-based
LVS.
Theorem 3: For any xt, we have oR(xt) = D(xt) and
oR(xt) = D(xt) for R = D. That is, for any xt the
performance of the RSS-based LVS with px = pox(xt) is
identical to the performance of the DRSS-based LVS.
Proof: Based on (25), (26), (50), and (51), we can see that
oR(xt), 
o
R(xt), D(xt), and D(xt) are all in the form of a
Q function. We denote oR(xt) = Q(oR), oR(xt) = Q(oR),
D(xt) = Q(D), and D(xt) = Q(D). In order to prove
oR(xt) = D(xt) and 
o
R(xt) = D(xt) for R = D, we
only need to prove oR   oR = D   D. As per (25), (26),
(50), and (51), in order to prove oR  oR = D  D (such as
to prove Theorem 3) we have to prove the following equation
(w u)T R 1 (w u) = (v u)T D 1 (v u) : (55)
Based on the singular value decomposition (SVD) of R, we
can transform the RSS observation vector y into another
observation vector y0 by rotating and scaling1. We can then
obtain the DRSS observations from y0 instead of y. The
transformation from y to y0 is unique since the singular values
of R are unique. In addition, y follows a multivariate normal
distribution. As such, the transformation from y to y0 keeps
all the properties of y in y0, which means the performance of
an LVS based on y is identical to the performance of an LVS
based on y0 [38, 39]. Therefore, in order to prove Theorem 3
we only have to prove (55) for R = IN . Denoting g = v u,
we have vm  um = gm   gN . Substituting R = IN into
w given in (16), we obtain
w   u = g   g
TR 11N
1TNR
 11N
1N = g  
0@ 1
N
NX
j=1
gj
1A1N :
1The covariance matrix R is a real positive-definite symmetric matrix, and
thus the SVD of R can be written as R = SR0ST . As such, y0 is given by
y0 = R0
1
2 Sy and the covariance matrix of y0 will be IN .
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With regard to the left side of (55), for R = IN we have
(w u)T R 1 (w u) =
NX
i=1
0@gi   1
N
NX
j=1
gj
1A2
=
NX
i=1
264g2i   2N gi
NX
j=1
gj +
1
N2
0@ NX
j=1
gj
1A2
375
=
264 NX
i=1
g2i  
2
N
 
NX
i=1
gi
!0@ NX
j=1
gj
1A+ 1
N
0@ NX
j=1
gj
1A2
375
=
24 NX
i=1
g2i  
1
N
 
NX
i=1
gi
!235 : (56)
As per the definition of D given in (39), for R = IN we have
D = IN 1 + 1(N 1)(N 1); (57)
where 1(N 1)(N 1)) is the (N 1)(N 1) matrix with all
elements set to unity. Then, based on the Sherman-Morrison
formula [40], we have
D 1 =
h
IN 1 + 1(N 1)  1T(N 1)
i 1
=
"
I 1N 1  
I 1N 11(N 1)(N 1)I
 1
N 1
1 + 1T(N 1)I
 1
N 11(N 1)
#
=

IN 1  
1(N 1)(N 1)
N

: (58)
Substituting (58) into the right side of (55), we have
(v u)T D 1 (v u)
=(v u)T

IN 1 
1(N 1)(N 1)
N

(v u)
=(v u)T IN 1 (v u)
  1
N
(v u)T 1(N 1)  1T(N 1) (v u)
=
N 1X
i=1
(gi   gN )2   1
N
"
N 1X
i=1
(gi   gN )
#2
=
NX
i=1
(gi   gN )2   1
N
"
NX
i=1
(gi   gN )
#2
=
NX
i=1
(gi   gN )2  1
N
NX
i=1
(gi   gN )
24 NX
j=1
(gj   gN )
35
=
24 NX
i=1
g2i  
1
N
 
NX
i=1
gi
!235 : (59)
Comparing (56) with (59), we can see that we have proved
(55) for R = IN . This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
We note that the result provided in Theorem 3 is valid
for any R, i.e., for any kind of shadowing (correlated or
uncorrelated). We also note that in Theorem 3 the condition
to guarantee the RSS-based LVS being identical to the DRSS-
based LVS is that px = pox(xt). This condition forces the
malicious user to optimize his transmit power based on the
given xt in the RSS-based LVS, but not in the DRSS-based
LVS. Without this condition, the comparison result between
the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-based LVS is present in the
following corollary. Two intuitive explanations for Theorem 3
are as follows. i) Knowing the transmit power of the legitimate
user by the LVS enables the RSS-based LVS to gain an
advantage over the DRSS-based LVS. This is due to the fact
that p together with d provide useful information on RSS
observations while DRSS observations are not functions of
p and d. ii) The malicious user’s knowledge on p and d
allows him to optimally set his transmit power (equivalently,
to optimize px) in the RSS-based LVS. This nullifies the
advantage of the RSS-based LVS over the DRSS-based LVS.
Following Theorem 3, we further have the following four
corollaries with regard to the performances of the RSS-based
and DRSS-based LVSs.
Corollary 3: For any N+1 > 2 the detection performances
of the RSS-based and DRSS-based LVSs will at be at least as
good as the performances for N .
The proof of Corollary 3 follows from the fact that the
RHS of (56) (and (59)) for N + 1 > 2 is equal or larger
than that for N . We note that the equality can only occur in
the most unusual of circumstances (such as the malicious user
reporting his true location). As such, in practice increases in
N will effectively always lead to an improvement in detection
performance.
Corollary 4: In the DRSS-based LVS, any of the BSs can be
selected as the reference BS, and this selection does not effect
the performance of the DRSS-based LVS.
The proof of Corollary 4 follows from the fact that (59)
does not depend on the selection of the reference BS.
Corollary 5: For any xt, the performance of the RSS-based
LVS with px 6= pox(xt) is better than the performance of the
DRSS-based LVS.
The proof of Corollary 5 follows from Corollary 1 and the
proof of Theorem 3.
Corollary 6: We have R = 

D and 

R = 

D for 

R =
D. That is, the performance of the RSS-based LVS for px =
px and xt = x

t is identical to the performance of the DRSS-
based LVS for xt = x
y
t .
Proof: Based on Theorem 3, in order to prove Corollary 6
we only have to prove xt = x
y
t . We note that x

t and x
y
t
are obtained through minimizing (pox(xt);xt) and '(xt),
respectively. As such, in order to prove xt = x
y
t , it suffices to
prove (pox(xt);xt) = '(xt). As per (15) and (43), we can
see that we have proved (pox(xt);xt) = '(xt) in (55).
We note that Corollary 6 presents a comparison between
the performance limits of the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-
based LVS. In the proof of Corollary 6, we also prove that the
malicious user’s optimal true location for the RSS-based LVS
is the same as that for the DRSS-based LVS. We also note that
the analysis and results reported in this work are not directly
applicable to the colluding threat scenario (where multiple
colluding adversaries attack the LVS). Future studies may wish
to explore these more sophisticated attacks, in the context of
correlated shadowing. However, although such sophisticated
attacks will obviously lead to poorer LVS performance, a
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Fig. 1. ROC curves of the RSS-based LVS for dB = 7:5, Dc = 50m,
r = 500m, px = pox(xt), and N = 3
 
x1 = [ 250; 10], x2 = [0; 10],
and x3 = [250; 10]

.
conjecture is that the trends discovered here with regard to
the impact of correlated shadowing on LVS performance will
persist.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now present numerical results to verify the accuracy
of our provided analysis. We also provide some insights
on the impact of the spatially correlated shadowing on the
performance of the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-based LVS.
Although we have simulated a wide range of system set-
tings, the associated settings for the results shown in this work
(unless otherwise stated) are as follows. In the simulations
presented here, the BSs and the claimed locations are deployed
in a 500m-by-20m rectangular area and a 200m-by-200m
square area. The 500m-by-20m rectangular area mimics a
stretch of a road (e.g., a highway) in which emerging ITS will
be applicable and LVSs will be of significant importance. The
simulations for the 200m-by-200m square area investigates
LVSs in the context of wireless sensor networks, in which
senors provide observation of various physical phenomena
(e.g., temperature, humidity) together with their location infor-
mation to the BSs. The origin is set at the center of the rectan-
gular area, with the x-coordinate taken along the length, and
the y-coordinate taken along the width. The claimed location
of a user (legitimate or malicious) is set as xc = [50; 5], which
is also the true location of the legitimate user. The locations
of all BSs are provided in the caption of each figure, and all
BSs collect measurements from the legitimate and malicious
users. The path loss exponent is set to  = 3, and the reference
power is set to p =  10 dB at d = 1m.
In Fig. 1, we present the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curves of the RSS-based LVS. In order to obtain this
figure, we have set the BSs at regular intervals (250m) on
each side of the rectangular area. In this figure, we first observe
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Fig. 2. ROC curves of the DRSS-based LVS for dB = 10, Dc = 50m, r =
500m, and N = 3
 
x1 = [ 250; 10], x2 = [0; 10], and x3 = [250; 10]

.
that the Monte Carlo simulations precisely match the theoretic
results, confirming our analysis in Theorem 1. We also observe
that the ROC curves for xt 6= xt dominate the ROC curve
for xt = xt . This observation indicates that if the malicious
user does not optimize his true location, it will be easier for
the RSS-based LVS to detect the malicious user. In summary,
the ROC curve for xt = xt provides a lower bound for the
performance of the RSS-based LVS.
In Fig. 2, we present the ROC curves of the DRSS-based
LVS. In order to obtain this figure, we have adopted the same
locations of the BSs. We note that a different value of dB
is adopted to produce Fig. 2 in order to avoid the identical
between Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. In this figure, we first observe
that the Monte Carlo simulations precisely match the theoretic
results, confirming our analysis in Theorem 2. We also observe
that the ROC curves for xt 6= xyt dominate the ROC curve for
xt = x
y
t . Again, this observation demonstrates the importance
of optimally choosing the true location for the malicious user.
To conclude, the ROC curve for xt = x
y
t provides a lower
bound for the performance of the DRSS-based LVS.
In Fig. 3, we present the ROC curves of the RSS-based LVS
and the DRSS-based LVS. In order to obtain this figure, we
have set one of the BSs at one side of the rectangular area and
deployed the other two BSs randomly inside the rectangular
area. This mimics the scenario in which only one fixed BS
is available and we have to conduct location verification with
the help of two already-authorized vehicles. In this figure, we
first observe that the RSS-based LVS for px = pox(xt) and
the DRSS-based LVS achieve identical performance (identical
ROC curves). This demonstrates that as long as the malicious
user optimizes his transmit power (as per his true location) the
RSS-based LVS is identical to the DRSS-based LVS, which
confirms the analytical comparison between the RSS-based
LVS and the DRSS-based LVS presented in Theorem 3. We
also observe that the ROC curves of the RSS-based LVS for
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px 6= pox(xt) dominate the ROC curves of the DRSS-based
LVS. This observation confirms that if the malicious user does
not optimize his transmit power, the RSS-based LVS achieves
a better performance than the DRSS-based LVS, which is
provided in Corollary 5. This indicates that the RSS-based
LVS is subjectively better than the DRSS-based LVS since
the performance of the DRSS-based LVS is independent of
the malicious user’s transmit power and the determination of
the optimal transmit power for the malicious user is no longer
required in the DRSS-based LVS.
In Fig. 4, we investigate the impact of the spatial correlation
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Fig. 5. ROC curves of the RSS-based LVS (px = px) and the DRSS-based
LVS for dB = 5, Dc = 50m, xt = xt = x
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of the shadowing on the performance of the RSS-based LVS
and the DRSS-based LVS, where Dc = 0m corresponds
to the case with uncorrelated shadowing. In Fig. 4, we set
px = p

x and xt = x

t for the RSS-based LVS. From (12) and
(17), we can see that both px and x

t are dependent on the
spatial correlation of the shadowing (they are both functions
of Dc), and the exact values of px and x

t corresponding to
each Dc are also provided in Fig. 4. In this figure, we first
observe the ROC curve moves toward the upper left corner
(i.e., the area under the ROC curve increases) as Dc increases,
which shows that the performance of the RSS-based LVS
becomes better as Dc increases. This observation demonstrates
that the spatial correlation of the shadowing improves the
detection performance of the RSS-based LVS. Intuitively, this
improvement is due to the fact that the increased Dc reduces
the randomness embedded in the RSS observations, and thus it
is more difficult for the malicious user to mimic the legitimate
observations for the increased Dc (i.e., the KL divergence
presented in (10) increases as Dc increases under the system
settings of Fig. 4). We note that the above performance
improvement due to the spatial correlation of the shadowing
is only achieved under the condition px = px and xt = x

t .
If the malicious user is physically limited at some specific
location xt and he optimizes his transmit power as per xt,
i.e., px = pox(xt), the spatial correlation of the shadowing
does not have a monotonic impact on the performance of the
RSS-based LVS. As per Theorem 3 and Corollary 6, the ROC
curves provided in Fig. 4 are also valid for the DRSS-based
LVS, in which we have to set xt = x
y
t . As such, we can
conclude that the spatial correlation of the shadowing also
improves the detection performance of the DRSS-based LVS.
Also, for a determined xt the spatial correlation does not have
a monotonic impact on the performance of the DRSS-based
LVS.
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In Fig. 5, we examine the impact of the parameter r on
the performance of both the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-
based LVS. We note that r is the minimum distance between
the claimed location and the malicious user’s true location.
As such, the disc determined by xc and r can be interpreted
as the area protected by some physical boundaries. In Fig. 5,
we observe that the ROC curve moves toward the upper left
corner as r increases, which indicates that the malicious user
will be easier to detect if he is further away from his claimed
location. We also observe that the performance improvement
due to increasing r is not significant when r is larger than
some specific value (e.g., r > 250m).
VI. DISCUSSIONS
We would like to clarify that the a priori knowledge model
given in (1) does not represent an exhaustive decision space
and also does not involve localization errors (e.g., GPS errors)
on the true location of the legitimate user. However, we can
adopt a generalized a priori knowledge model to address these
two effects, which is given by(
H0 : xt = xc + xe (legitimate user),
H1 : kxc   xtk  r (malicious user);
(60)
where xe is the a priori uncertainty of xt at the legitimate
user and the a priori distribution of xe is denoted as f(xe).
We can specify different a priori knowledge on xe in order
to consider the exhaustive decision space or the localization
error. Specifically, we can assume kxek < r for the exhaustive
decision space in order to avoid any overlap between the
possible spaces under H0 and H1. We would like to clarify
that kxek < r means that xe is randomly distributed inside
a disk with the origin at the center and r as the radius. In
practice, this disk can be approximated as an area with some
physical boundaries (e.g., fences). We note that the assump-
tion, kxek < r, is normally adopted in the “in-region” location
verification systems [41, 42], which were mainly investigated
via new protocol designs rather than via statistical analysis.
From a statistical point of view, we have to adopt some specific
a priori distribution for xe under the constraint kxek < r in
order to conduct further analysis. With regard to the impact
of the localization error on the true location of the legitimate
user, it is reasonable to assume that xe follows a zero-mean
normal distribution with a covariance matrix determined by
the localization error (i.e., f(xe) = N (0;), where  is
the covariance matrix associated with the localization error).
We note that the assumption of normal distribution does not
ensure kxek < r. We have checked numerically that this
assumption does not significantly impact the results compared
to the scenarios where kxek < r is actually imposed as an
additional constraint.
The main variation on our RSS-based and DRSS-based
LVSs caused by the adoption of the generalized a priori
knowledge model given in (60) involves the determination of
the likelihood functions under H0. Different from (5), in the
RSS-based LVS the new likelihood function under H0 based
on (60) is given by
fg (yjH0) =
Z
xe
f (yjxe;H0) f(xe)dxe; (61)
False positive rate
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Fig. 6. ROC curves of the RSS-based LVS for dB = 5, r = 100m,
xt = [4:2; 83:9], Dc = 50,  = diagf21 ; 22g, 1 = 2 = 20, and
N = 3
 
x1 = [0; 10], x2 = [131:4; 9:3], and x3 = [20:6; 0:9]

where f (yjxe;H0) can be obtained by replacing xc with xt
in (5). Likewise, in the DRSS-based LVS the new likelihood
function under H0 based on (60) is given by
fg (yjH0) =
Z
xe
f (yjxe;H0) f(xe)dxe; (62)
where f (yjxe;H0) can be obtained by replacing xc
with xt in (40). Closed-from expressions for fg (yjH0)
and fg (yjH0) are generally hard, if not impossible, to
achieve. Therefore, we numerically calculate fg (yjH0) and
fg (yjH0), and then evaluate the performances of the re-
sultant RSS-based and DRSS-based LVSs by utilizing our
previous theoretic analysis as the benchmark.
The results of our numerical studies are provided in Fig. 6,
where we adopt the RSS-based LVS as an example (following
Theorem 3 the results are valid for the DRSS-based LVS
as well). We note that the curve for xt = xc is for the a
priori model given in (1), which is obtained from our previous
analysis (i.e., (32) and (33)). The curve for xt = xc+xe with
normal xe is obtained by numerically calculating fg (yjH0)
given in (61) with f(xe) = N (0;), and the curve for
xt = xc + xe with uniform xe is achieved through nu-
merically evaluating fg (yjH0) by assuming xe is uniformly
distributed within the region determined by r. We refer to
former case as the ‘localization error’ and the latter as the
‘exhaustive decision space’. As expected, we observe that
both the localization error and the exhaustive decision space
reduce the detection performance of the RSS-based LVS.
We also observe that the impact of the localization error is
relatively weak even when the localization error is up to tens
of meters (i.e., 1 = 2 = 20). Meanwhile, the effect of the
exhaustive decision space is significant as a consequence of
the adopted uniform distribution for xe. This is due to the fact
that the possible true locations of the legitimate user are more
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 12
concentrated near the origin under the normal distribution
relative to the uniform distribution.
We would like to highlight that dB can be estimated
in our LVSs simultaneously when the a priori estimate is
unavailable (e.g., due to time or resource limitations). When
dB is unknown, instead of utilizing the LRT given in (9)
as the decision rule, we have to adopt the generalized LRT
(GLRT) as our decision rule in which we have to estimate
dB based on measurements. As an example, we detail the
estimation of dB under H0 in the RSS-based LVS. Following
(5), the likelihood function of y under H0 for a given dB can
be rewritten as
f (yjH0) =
exp

  1
22dB
(y   u)TT 1(y   u)

q
(2)N2NdB jTj
; (63)
where Tij =

 dijDc ln 2

. Adopting the maximum likelihood
estimation, the estimate of dB under H0 can be obtained
through
bdB jH0 = argmax
dB
f (yjdB ;H0) =
r
1
N
(y   u)TT 1(y   u):
(64)
We note that the estimate of dB under H1, bdB jH1, can be
obtained in a similar procedure. After plugging bdB jH0 andbdB jH1 into f (yjH0) and f (yjpx;xt ;H1), respectively, we
can still utilize (31) as our decision rule. However, we would
like to highlight that the false positive and detection rates of
(31) with bdB jH0 and bdB jH1 cannot be derived in closed-
form expressions, since bdB jH0 and bdB jH1 are not equal.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we have formally analyzed for the first time,
the performances of two important types of LVSs (RSS and
DRSS-based) in the regime of spatially correlated shadowing.
Our analysis illustrates that for anticipated levels of correlated
shadowing both types of LVSs will have much improved
performance. In addition, we formally proved that in fact a
DRSS-based LVS has identical performance to that of an RSS-
based LVS, for all levels of correlated shadowing. Even more
surprisingly, the identical performance of RSS and DRSS-
based LVSs was found to hold even when the adversary cannot
optimize his true location. We found the performance of an
RSS-based LVS to be better than that of a DRSS-based LVS
only in the case where the adversary cannot optimize all
variables under her control. The results presented here will be
important for a wide range of practical location authentication
systems deployed in support of emerging wireless network
applications.
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